Pavel Durov blames Meta and Jio for BGP hijacks that block Telegram in India

Pavel Durov says Telegram is being blocked outside India by “a rogue method called BGP hijacking,” and he points the finger at Reliance’s Jio, which he claims is sabotaging access. Durov posted the allegation on X, writing that “Indian telecom Reliance is sabotaging access to Telegram for millions of users OUTSIDE India (including the UAE) via a rogue method called BGP hijacking.” He also adds that the “sabotage seems intentional, as Reliance has ignored multiple reports.”

Here is the key technical idea behind his claim, in plain English: BGP is the routing system that internet routers use to decide where traffic should go. If someone publishes inaccurate routing announcements that associate an online service with the wrong IP address, those fake “directions” can spread quickly. When that happens, users can struggle to reach the affected services, because the internet has effectively been told to deliver the traffic to the wrong place.

Durov ties the alleged disruption to Meta through a second accusation about incentives, not just mechanics. He wrote that Reliance is “partially owned by Meta,” and he argues that this makes the situation look like competition rather than a random network problem. In his post, he goes further, saying “The decision to ban Telegram in India looks more like a way to help WhatsApp protect its market share than a legitimate regulatory action that can fix anything.” In other words, he is not only alleging a routing attack. He is suggesting a broader pattern that links network reachability problems and India’s policy moves around Telegram.

Meta’s involvement in Reliance is real, at least in the financial and operational sense described in the source. Meta has invested in Reliance, to the tune of $5.7 billion. Two weeks prior to the report, Meta announced it will use a datacenter operated by the Indian company. That means Durov’s claim about “intentional” sabotage is at least fueled by an undeniable fact about relationship depth, even though he provides no proof for the specific accusation that Jio actually ran BGP hijacks.

Jio, for its part, denies any routing misconfiguration. The company said: “Jio continues to operate its network in accordance with global internet routing best practices and the highest standards of reliability, security, and transparency.” Durov offered no evidence for his theory, but his argument also has a second narrative strand: that Indian authorities are singling out Telegram.

The source explains that India decided to block Telegram for six days to prevent scams and other misconduct at the time of a medical studies entrance exam that over two million people will sit. The decision was taken by India’s IT ministry, at the urging of the National Testing Agency, which oversees exams. Durov criticized the ban as punishment aimed at ordinary users, writing that it “punishes 150M+ ordinary Telegram users in India - not the insiders who leaked the exam materials.” He also argues that the scams and leaks authorities hoped to prevent would likely shift to other apps.

The regulatory framing around Telegram is more complicated than a simple “ban for safety,” at least based on what the source says about why some Indian entities have argued for bans or tighter regulation. Those reasons include Telegram’s uncooperative response to requests for assistance from law enforcement, suspicions that Telegram facilitates content piracy, and Telegram’s allowance of user anonymity. There is also industry friction: Indian telcos are unhappy that services like Telegram and WhatsApp provide voice services but are not governed by the same laws as licensed carriers.

In that context, Durov’s deeper conspiracy claim lands as the most contentious. He wrote that abuse of global internet routing is “alarming” and that he “wouldn’t be surprised if Reliance/WhatsApp were also behind the recent lobbying effort to ban Telegram in India.” The source notes that this suggestion is hard to sustain, because it implies Telegram is singled out for reasons that may not match the exam-time rationale described, or the broader set of concerns cited by Indian stakeholders.

Why this matters for executives and operators, even if you never touch BGP day-to-day: these allegations sit right on the intersection of infrastructure control, platform competition, and regulatory leverage. If a messaging service can be disrupted through internet routing behavior, that is not just a technical nuisance. It becomes a reputational risk, a user-loss trigger, and a regulatory accelerant. And if government action is perceived as competitive strategy, it can reshape how regulators, telecom partners, and platforms negotiate future access, compliance, and data demands. The strategic stakes are simple: when networks and policy are both on the table, “it’s just routing” or “it’s just regulation” stops being a safe assumption for anyone whose product depends on global reach.