US Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth is standing up a new Pentagon office with unusual reach over drones and other uncrewed systems. Under the memo described by Business Insider, the office, called the Direct Reporting Portfolio Manager for Unmanned Systems, is set to become “the single joint integrator for all unmanned and autonomous system programs” across the US Department of Defense. In practice, that means the office can decide what moves forward, what gets prioritized, and what work gets stopped, as the Trump administration pushes to prepare forces for “drone warfare.”

Hegseth’s plan is sweeping: “Nearly all of the Pentagon's drone programs will now exist under one office,” with just a few notable exceptions. One major gap is the US Air Force’s Collaborative Combat Aircraft program, which will remain with the services and follow its separate acquisitions process. But beyond that, DRPM-UxS is positioned as the main traffic controller for a wide portfolio: small uncrewed systems, surface vessels (including drone boats), underwater vessels in coordination with the DoD submarine office, ground robots, autonomous and artificial intelligence systems, drone swarming technology, and counter-drone systems.

Why does this matter so much? Because in defense procurement, who controls the integration point can quietly determine winners and losers across the supply chain. If a single office is responsible for prioritizing capabilities and contracts, it can force programs to compete on the same scoring system instead of competing on separate service priorities. DRPM-UxS can also accelerate procurement and fielding of drones, which the memo frames as a major priority of the second Trump administration as it seeks to scale drone capabilities at battlefield speed.

DRPM-UxS will also oversee the “drone marketplaces” that some DoD offices have recently established. That’s a big detail because marketplaces are not just procurement paperwork, they are a mechanism for matching demand to suppliers faster, often by lowering the friction between experimentation and adoption. When combined with an office that can prioritize or cease work on specific systems, these marketplaces can become a pipeline for rapid iteration. In other words, the office is not only deciding what to buy, it is also shaping how the ecosystem of drone vendors gets connected to that buying.

The structure also includes a tight reporting line. DRPM-UxS’ director has not been named yet, but the director will report to Stephen Feinberg, the US deputy secretary of defense. Feinberg and Hegseth are the main named leaders in this setup, and the chain of command signals how centralized authority is intended to be. For executives who normally operate inside service-specific lanes, that centralization can change the rhythm of decisions: fewer doors, but bigger consequences for what gets approved.

There are also defined boundaries to the authority. Alongside the Air Force’s CCA program, DRPM-UxS will handle certain counter-drone and autonomy initiatives rather than swallowing everything. The office will be in charge of Joint Interagency Task Force 401, a military and federal government effort to counter small drones. It will also oversee Defense Autonomous Warfare Group, described as DoD’s office for mass-producing autonomous drones across the military. Meanwhile, other weapons programs already following a separate acquisitions process are left out of this new integrator model.

This reorg lands inside a broader push that the source describes as financially and operationally aggressive. The article notes Pentagon officials have called it an unprecedented $74 billion budget request for drones and counter-drone systems. That request is paired with “massive investments” in acquiring, testing, and fielding small, cheap one-way attack drones. The argument in the memo is that the US has been slow relative to the threat environment. Hegseth writes: “Adversaries collectively produce millions of unmanned systems each year across all domains,” and that “While global military unmanned systems production has skyrocketed over the last three years, the United States has been slow to field these capabilities at scale.” He adds: “Drones and autonomous systems are the most consequential battlefield innovation of this generation.”

For defense and autonomy leaders, the second-order implication is straightforward even if the mechanics are complex. A single integrator can compress timelines, concentrate leverage, and redirect budgets toward whatever the office decides is the fastest path to scaled fielding. For boards and investors, it raises the stakes around program selection and partnership strategy: if DRPM-UxS can prioritize certain capabilities, contracts, and workstreams, diligence can no longer stop at a single service’s roadmap. The center of gravity for unmanned systems is being shifted, and companies that have relied on fragmented adoption cycles may find the new rule is speed plus alignment, not just innovation.