NBER study links iPhone access to 4.5%-8% fewer births for teens

The iPhone is getting blamed for something it never sold: fewer babies. An NBER working paper argues that in the first four years after iPhones hit the market, places with access to the device saw births drop materially compared to places without access. For ages 15 to 19, the study reports reduced births from 4.5% to 8%; for ages 20 to 24, reductions range from 3.2% to 6.6%. The paper’s punchline is that births are declining way faster where you could get the iPhone than where you couldn’t.

The study builds its case with a natural experiment created by AT&T’s iPhone monopoly. From June 2007 to Feb. 2011, AT&T was the only provider distributing the iPhone, which pioneered smartphone technology. That matters because researchers can compare geographies where AT&T was selling the device to parts of the country where it was not yet being sold, while holding other conditions as much as possible through statistical controls. Even after controlling for variables relating to home prices and differences between more urban and less urban regions, the relationship remained: greater iPhone sales corresponded with less fertility.

To understand why this gets economists leaning forward, you have to zoom out on the “baby-less recovery” puzzle. The United States has seen dropping fertility rates for nearly two decades, with rates hitting an all-time low in 2024. When birth rates started dropping, fewer births were not surprising to scientists. Fertility has historically correlated with challenging economic times, and the Great Recession fits that pattern. But the part that sticks is what came after the economy improved. Myers described the post-2008 period as a baby-less recovery: the economy recovered, and births didn’t. Great, so what changed besides the economy?

The paper and its accompanying reporting put forward a mechanism that is less traditional than unemployment or housing affordability. Lower fertility can create real economic headaches down the line: a smaller population in the labor force and reduced total spend. It can also accelerate an aging population with fewer economic stimulants, placing strain on social benefits like Social Security and Medicare. The source is careful to note that there are multiple contributors already on the table, including rising housing and childcare costs and economic anxiety. Myers is not denying those. But she argues the effect she sees is “huge,” and that executives, policymakers, and planners should consider how technology may be changing how people connect.

That “how we connect” argument leans on years of psychological research about screen time and mental health. Psychologists such as Jonathan Haidt (author of The Anxious Generation) and Jean Twenge from San Diego State University have warned about “great rewiring,” where easier access to technologies can reshape attachments and behaviors. Their broader claim, as summarized in the source, is that increased screen usage is associated with mental health struggles like anxiety and depression and can lower cognitive capability. Myers suggests these theories could extend to birth rates.

In the NBER-related analysis described here, the researchers used data from the National Survey of Family Growth to look beyond just births. They report not only a decline in activities young people do with peers outside of work and school, but also a decrease in the frequency of sex. And the trend does not appear to be stopping at millennials and Gen X. About two decades later, the source notes Gen Z is dating less and having less sex than older generations, with reasons tied to high costs of going out and emotional disruptions of dating.

What’s striking for decision-makers is that the story is not just “technology reduces fertility.” It is “technology may reduce the inputs that lead to relationships,” and relationships are not a single switch. Sarah Meyer, managing director at cognitive assessment platform MyIQ, previously told Fortune that many younger adults are no longer treating relationships as proof of stability. Instead, they are asking whether relationships add to safety, focus, and self-understanding, or introduce instability they have worked to avoid. In other words, the decline may be less about motivation and more about perceived risk and opportunity cost.

Myers, in the source, frames the concern with a human question that still lands like an earnings risk in the real world: “I’m wondering, like, are we okay?” She is worried that if the decline is driven by people being “depressed and alone and doomscrolling,” the social and economic consequences could compound. The source also leaves room for nuance and better measurement. Myers as an economist said her job is to measure the phenomenon, not to force a single explanation. Data that clarifies causes, she noted, could be crucial for designing policy interventions, especially since the data also points to declining rates of teen pregnancy, which is often a positive outcome.

So what should executives take from this, beyond the obvious “phones bad” headlines? The second-order stake is planning under uncertainty. Companies and boards are already managing labor force risks, healthcare demand shifts, and demographic headwinds. If technology-related behavior change is a meaningful driver of fertility decline, then the response might not live only in childcare subsidies and economic stabilization. It could also involve mental health, digital design, and community-building incentives. The strategic risk is assuming the next few years will follow the old playbook where fertility tracks only economic cycles. This research suggests at least part of the story may be new, and it is already showing up in the data.